**Theorem** For every quantum operation on an open system  $\Phi$ :  $M_n \rightarrow M_m$  there exist  $r \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $F_1, \ldots, F_r \in M_{m,n}$  such that  $\sum_{j=1}^{r} F_j^{\dagger} F_j = I_n$  and MXN for all  $A \in M_n$ .

$$\mathbb{P}^{n}M_{n} \rightarrow M_{n}$$

tive

This is called the operator sum representation of the quantum operation. The matrices  $F_1, \ldots, F_r$  are called the Kraus operators of the operations.

በኦጦ

*Proof.* Suppose  $\Phi: M_n \to M_m$  is an quantum operation. We may assume that  $\Phi(\rho)$  is the partial trace of

 $F_i A F_i^{\dagger}$ 

 $\Phi(A) = \sum_{i=1}^{n}$ 

$$U(\sigma \otimes \rho)U^{\dagger} \in M_{nk}$$
 with  $nk = mr$ .

Here U may depends on t. By purification, we may assume that  $\sigma = E_{11}$  so that

$$U(\sigma \otimes \rho)U^{\dagger} = U\begin{pmatrix} \rho & 0\\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}U^{\dagger} = \begin{pmatrix} F_1\\ \vdots\\ F_r \end{pmatrix}\rho(F_1^*|\cdots|F_r^*)$$

with diagonal blocks  $F_1 \rho F_1^{\dagger}, \ldots, F_r \rho F_r^{\dagger}$  so that

$$\operatorname{tr}_1(U(\sigma\otimes\rho)U^{\dagger}=\sum_{j=1}^r F_j\rho F_j^{\dagger}.$$

Here  $(F_1^{\dagger}, \ldots, F_r^{\dagger})$  are the first *n* rows of  $U^{\dagger}$ .



**Remark** quantum channels are trace preserving completely positive linear maps.

P(9) = 0

80

P

ß

linear maps. **Example** Let  $U_1, \ldots, U_r \in U(n)$  and  $p_1, \ldots, p_r$  be positive numbers summing up to 1. Then  $\Phi: M_n \to M_n$  defined by

$$\Phi(A) = \sum_{j=1}^{r} p_j U_j A U_j^{\dagger} \quad \text{for all } A \in M_n$$

is a quantum channel known as the random unitary channel or mixed unitary channel.

\$61,= N2m N2m

#### Quantum channels and Measurements

When a quantum state  $\rho$  is transmitted through a quantum channel, it will interact with the external environment. So, we may regard the transmission as a process of letting the quantum state going through a quantum operation of an open system, and assume the received state has the form

$$\hat{\rho} = \sum_{j=1}^{r} F_j \rho F_j^{\dagger}$$

Here  $F_1, \ldots, F_r$  are the Kraus operators caused by the influence of the environment on  $\rho$ . In this context,  $F_1, \ldots, F_r$  are known a the **error operators**.

#### Positive Operator-Valued Measure (POVM)

• Eigenprojections of A.

Quantum measurements can be viewed as quantum operations on open systems. As mentioned before a Hermitian matrix  $A = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \lambda_j |\lambda_j\rangle \langle \lambda_j|$  is associated with an observable. If a state  $\rho \in D_n$  goes through the measurement process corresponding to A, the state  $\rho$  will "collapse" to one of the pure states  $|\lambda_j\rangle \langle \lambda_j|$ with a probability tr  $(A\rho)$ .

• Projective measurement.

In general, if  $A = \sum_{j=1}^{s} \lambda_j P_j$ , where  $P_j$  is the projection operator corresponding to the eigenvalue  $\lambda_j$  for the distinct eigenvalues  $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_s$  of A. In such a case, the **projective measurement** of  $\rho$  under the measurement associated with A is the quantum operation

where  $p_j = \operatorname{tr}(P_j \rho P_j) = \operatorname{tr}(\rho P_j)$  and the set  $\{P_1, \ldots, P_r\}$  satisfies the completeness relation  $\sum_j P_j P_j^{\dagger} = \sum_j P_j = I$ .



• POVM. for any positive semidefinite matrices  $Q_1, \ldots, Q_r \in M_n$ such that  $Q_1 + \cdots + Q_r = I_n$ , there are  $M_1, \ldots, M_r \in M_n$ such that  $M_j^{\dagger}M_j = Q_j$ . The measurement operators are then associated with the quantum operation

$$\rho \mapsto \sum_{j=1}^r M_j \rho M_j^{\dagger}$$

so that  $\rho$  will change to the quantum state  $\frac{1}{p_j}M_j\rho M_j^{\dagger}$  with a probability  $p_j = \operatorname{tr}(M_j\rho M_j^{\dagger}) = \operatorname{tr}(\rho Q_j)$ . The set  $\{Q_1, \ldots, Q_r\} = \{M_1^{\dagger}M_1, \ldots, M_r^{\dagger}M_r\}$  is known as the **positive operator-valued** measure (**POVM**).

**Example** Suppose Bob will be given a quantum state chosen from the linearly independent set of unit vectors  $\{|\psi_1\rangle, \ldots, |\psi_m\rangle\}$ , which may not be orthonormal. He can construct the following POVM  $\{Q_1, \ldots, Q_{m+1}\}$  such that he will know for sure that  $|\psi_j\rangle$  is sent to him if the measurement of the received state yields  $Q_j$  if  $Q_j = |\phi_j\rangle\langle\phi_j|/m$ , where  $\langle\phi_j|\phi_j\rangle = 1$  and  $\langle\phi_j|\psi_i\rangle = 0$  for all  $i \neq j$  for  $j = 1, \ldots, m$  and  $Q_{m+1} = I - \sum_{j=1}^m Q_j$ . Evidently, a measurement of  $|\psi_j\rangle\langle\psi_j|$  will yield  $Q_j$  or  $Q_{m+1}$ .



9

### Fidelity

**Definition** Let  $\rho_1, \rho_2 \in D_n$ . Then the fidelity is defined by

$$F(\rho_1, \rho_2) = \left\{ \operatorname{tr} \left( \sqrt{\sqrt{\rho_1 \rho_2} \rho_1} \right) \right\}^2.$$

Here,  $\sqrt{\rho_1}$  is the positive semi-definite square root of  $\rho_1$ , and  $\sqrt{\rho_1}\rho_2\sqrt{\rho_1}$  is positive semi-definite so that we can take its positive semi-definite square root.

**Theorem** Let 
$$\rho_1, \rho_2 \in \mathcal{S}(\mathcal{H})$$
. If  $\rho_1^{1/2} \rho_2^{1/2}$  has singular values  $s_1 \geq \dots \geq s_n$ , then  

$$F(\rho_1, \rho_2) = F(\rho_2, \rho_1) = \left[\sum_{j=1}^n s_j\right]^2,$$

and the following conditions hold.

- (1) For any unitary U,  $F(U\rho_1 U^{\dagger}, U\rho_2 U^{\dagger}) = F(\rho_1, \rho_2)$ .
- (2) If  $\rho_1$  or  $\rho_2$  is a pure state, then  $F(\rho_1, \rho_2) = \operatorname{tr}(\rho_1 \rho_2)$ .
- (3) We have

$$F(\rho_1, \rho_2) \in [0, 1].$$

The equality  $F(\rho_1, \rho_2) = 1$  holds if and only if  $\rho_1 = \rho_2$ . The equality  $F(\rho_1, \rho_2) = 0$  holds if and only if  $\operatorname{tr}(\rho_1 \rho_2) = 0$ , equivalently,  $\sigma_1^{\prime} \sigma_2^{s} = 0$  for any positive numbers r, s.

 $\langle S, S_2 \rangle$ = + (P, F2) ) 1 2 2 0

 $\Sigma \lambda_{1} \lambda_{2} > < \times$ 

Other numerical functions on a mixed states

- tr is the sum of the singular values • The trace distance: of  $\rho - \sigma$ . 0-
- The relative entropy of two quantum states  $\rho, \sigma \in D_n$  defined by S

$$\rho \| \sigma \rangle = -\operatorname{tr} \rho \ln \sigma + \operatorname{tr} \rho \ln \rho = \operatorname{tr} \rho (\rho - \sigma)$$

is another measure of the difference between the two quantum states. If there is  $|v\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^n$  such that  $\sigma |v\rangle = 0$  and  $\langle v|\rho|v\rangle \neq 0$ , then  $S(\rho \| \sigma) = \infty$ .

• The von Neumann entropy of a density matrix is defined as

where ln is the natural log function.







$$U = U = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

# Quantum Key distribution

Information are encrypted as 0 - 1 sequences. Alice and Bob use a private key K, a (long) 0-1 sequence to encrypt their accsages so that M is encrypted as  $\tilde{M} = M + K$  and decrypted by  $\tilde{M} + K$ . **Problem** How to exchanged the private key securely. Quantum properties offer solutions. We will be a secure of the private key secure of the priva **BB84** (Bennett and Brassard, 1984)

• Each of Alice and Bob use two bases for photon states:  $B_1 = \{|e_0\rangle, |e_1\rangle\}, B_2 = \{|f_0\rangle, |f_1\rangle\}.$ 

• Alice sends Bob 4M photons, each prepared in one of the two Dases randomly.

- Bob measures the received photons, each with one of the two bases randomly.
- Then they exchange notes and identify the photons that were sent and measured using the same bases. There should be roughly 2N such photons.
- They will use N of them to detect whether there is an eavesdropper, Eve, tampering their information.
- If Eve does intercept, the best things for her to do is to use  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  bases to measured the intercepted qubit, and then sends the measured qubit to Bob, using the same basis she obtains the measured result.
- Now, consider two cases. If Alice and Bob both used  $B_1$ , they should get a perfect match of information. However, if Eve has applied  $B_1$  or  $B_2$ , about 1/2 of the times she would use  $B_2$ , and sent out the bit so that 1/2 of the times that Bob will get the measured results agree with the photon sent by Alice.
- The same holds if both Alice and Bob used B2. So, roughly 1/4 of the N-bits would disagree. Alice and Bob would deduce that someone has intercept the information if there is a huge discrepancy in the N-bits comparison, and should retry the process.



## B92 Protocol

• Affice sends 8N photons to Bob using  $|e_0\rangle$  for 0 and  $|f_0\rangle$  for 1.

13

• Bob measures the received photons using  $B_1$  or  $B_2$  and omly.

K

- Suppose Alice sends  $|e_0\rangle$ . If Bob uses  $B_1$ , he will obtain  $|e_0\rangle$ ; if Bob uses  $B_2$ , he will obtain  $|f_0\rangle$  or  $|f_1\rangle$ . If he gets  $|f_1\rangle$ , he knows that Alice has sent  $|e_0\rangle$ .
- Suppose Alice send  $|f_0\rangle$ . If Bob uses  $B_2$ , he will obtain  $|f_0\rangle$ ; if he uses  $B_1$ , he will obtain  $|e_0\rangle$  or  $|e_1\rangle$ . If he gets  $|e_1\rangle$ , he knows that Alice has sent  $f_0\rangle$ .
- There are roughly 2N photons that Bob will know with certainty.
- He will use N of them to check the presence of Eve.
- If Eve indeed present, 1/16 of the bits will fails to match.



There are **E91** and **BBM92** protocols using entangled pairs and Bell-Inequalities to check the presence of Eve.